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CASE NOTES
older and majority view is more in conformity with the guarantees pro-
vided for in the due process clauses of the Federal and Illinois constitu-
tions. It is a distortion of justice to allow these clauses to be used as tools
to thwart the very principles upon which they are founded. Future deci-
sions will either re-establish the older principles of justice or lead us
further into a new understanding of the principles to which the present
decision points. Time alone will determine the direction.
DAMAGES-THE COMPENSATORY THEORY FAVORED
OVER THE COLLATERAL SOURCE DOCTRINE
The plaintiff, a doctor, suffered injuries when the defendant negligently
struck the rear of his automobile; plaintiff received medical care from his
colleagues and his permanently staffed nurse at no actual cost. In his bill
of particulars the plaintiff listed $2,235 for medical and nursing care, al-
leging that he should recover for such collateral benefits. The lower court
refused to allow recovery, and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed,
holding that the value of medical and nursing care rendered the injured
physician gratuitously was not recoverable as special damages, as it was
the policy of the Court to allow only actual compensatory damages in
recoveries. Coyne v. Campbell, 11 N.Y. 2d 372, 183 N.E. 2d 891 (1962).
The plaintiff based his theory of recovery on the New York Court of
Appeals case of Healy v. Rennert' where plaintiff, a fireman, was allowed
to recover although his medical and nursing bills had been paid by an in-
surance plan to which he had contributed, and even though his disability
allowed him to receive a disability pension. The Court however, in the
Coyne case, followed its ruling in Drinkwater v. Dinsmore,2 where a
plaintiff was precluded from collecting as damages lost wages which had
been paid gratuitously by his employer, and again applied the compen-
satory theory of damages. The Court said that the Healy case did not
cast doubt on the continued validity of the Drinkwater case, as the plain-
tiff contended, for there were factual distinctions between the two cases.
It was pointed out by the Court that in the Healy case, the plaintiff paid
a premium for the health insurance and had worked for eighteen years to
earn eligibility for the disability pension, whereas in the Coyne and Drink-
water cases, the plaintiffs' benefits were wholly gratuitous. The dissenting
opinion in the Coyne case stated that a tortfeasor should not be permitted
to deduct from his damages the benefits which plaintiff received from
another source gratuitously; in other words, it said that the collateral
source doctrine should have been applied in this case.
1 N.Y. 2d 202, 173 N.E. 2d 777 (1961). 2 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).
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By the Court's rendering the judgment, New York remains one of the
few jurisdictions which does not accept the application of the collateral
source. doctrine in cases where the benefits received are totally gratuitous.
The collateral source doctrine is that where the plaintiff, in a personal in-
jury action, receives collateral benefits from sources wholly independ-
ent of the defendant, such benefits cannot be declared by the defendant
in mitigation of damages.8 The litigation involving the issue of the collat-
eral source doctrine arises in two main factual situations. First, where the
plaintiff has received compensation from a source to which he has con-
tributed, such as insurance policies, employment contracts, and disability
pension plans; and second, where the plaintiff has received compensation
gratuitously, either in wages from his employer, or in the form of medical
and nursing benefits from governmental units or from the plaintiff's wife,
family or friends. The Healy case, upon which plaintiff relied, involved
the first of these situations whereas the Coyne case involved the second.
In the contribution situation, the courts, in the cases involving hospital
and medical insurance, have reached almost unanimous agreement in that
an injured person may recover for medical expenses due to injuries caused
by the defendant, even though such expenses were paid by insurance.4
The New Hampshire Supreme Court in Clough v. Schwartz5 ruled that
admission of hospital and medical bills into evidence by the plaintiff and
the exclusion of defendant's proof of payment of those bills by plaintiff's
group insurance plan did not constitute error. Similarly, the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut in Roth v. Cbatlos6 held that the defend-
ant is liable for injuries of which he was the proximate cause, and that
payment by third parties does not relieve or mitigate damages. In Leon
v. United States7 the plaintiff was allowed recovery of hospital bills
which had already been paid by an insurance plan. Within the past
decade both Kentucky8 and Wisconsin9 expressly overruled prior cases in
arriving at a position where they now allow recovery, but only where
the plaintiff has received collateral benefits from a source to which he has
contributed.
"Another situation where the plaintiff has contributed to the source
3 Hudson v. Lazarus, 217 F. 2d 344 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
4Leon v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. New York 1961).
594 N.H. 138, 48 A. 2d1921 (1946).
.6 97 Conn. 282, 116 Atl. 332 (1922).
.193 F. Supp. 8 (E.D. New York 1961).
. Conley y.- Foster, 335. S.W. 2d 904 (1960); Sedlock v. Trosper, 307 Ky. .369, 211
S.W. 2d 147 (1948).
9 Severson v. Milwaukee Auto. Ins. Co., 265 Wis. 488, 61 N.W.2d 872 (1953); Nelson
v. Pauli, 176 Wis. 1, 186 N.W. 21.7 (1922).
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from which he receives collateral benefits concerns pension plans. Here
also, there is almost unanimous holding in the courts that the defendant
is not allowed to mitigate damages in personal injury cases for the reason
that the plaintiff is receiving or about to receive a pension. In the Healy
case the plaintiff, who was due for normal retirement in two years at one-
half pay, retired immediately on a disability pension at three-fourths pay
due to the injury caused by the defendant; evidence to, this effect was not
allowed by the court. The Appellate Court of Illinois in Devine v. Chi-
cago'° ruled that excluding testimony of a widow on the question of how
much, if any, pension she had received since her husband's death was
proper. In Bencicb v. Market St. Ry.11 the Appellate Court of California
ruled that evidence showing plaintiff retired upon a pension was not ad-
missable for the purpose of reducing damages recoverable on account of
loss of earnings.
In the gratuitous situations the courts, in the cases involving medical
and nursing benefits rendered gratuitously from governmental units or
from the plaintiff's wife, family or friends, have split, with the majority
holding that the plaintiff can recover the reasonable value of such serv-
ices. In Crouse v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. 12 the value of services rendered
by the wife in nursing her husband for injuries sustained by him were re-
coverable by him in a personal injuries action. The Court of Appeals of
Kentucky in Cincinnati N.O. & T.R. Ry. v. Perkins's ruled, in a situation
where the plaintiff was not working at the time he was injured, that the
plaintiff is allowed to recover for loss of wages while disabled, for it is
the loss of the opportunity to seek employment, rather than the amount
of wages lost, that determines recovery. In Standard Oil v. United States1 4
the court said:
In the United States the prevailing rule seems to be that an injured person
may recover for wages lost and medical expenses incurred during his inca-
pacity even though such amounts were supplied by insurance, a contract of
employment, or gratuitously.15
In the minority rule jurisdictions no recovery is allowed in a personal
injury action for medical, nursing and/or wages rendered gratuitously,
since the plaintiff did not actually suffer an out-of-pocket loss.10 In Dan-
iels v. Celeste"7 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said that in
10 172 IIl. App. 246 (1912).
1129 Cal. App. 2d 641, 85 P. 2d 556:(1938).
12 102 Wis. 196, 78 N.W. 446 (1899). 14 153 F. 2d 958 (9th Cir. 1946).
"3 205 Ky. 798, 266 S.W. 652 (1924). 15 ld. at 963.
16 DePaulis v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. New York 1961); Drinkwater v.
Dinsmore, 80 N.Y. 390 (1880).
17 303 Mass. 148, 21 N.E. 2d 1 (1939).
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an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the reasonable value
of necessary medical and surgical and of nursing care is an element of
damage, but recovery may be had only if the plaintiff has paid for such
services, or has incurred a liability to pay therefore, or will incur such a
liability in the future. The recovery, it is reasoned, is purely compensa-
tory. The injured person receives only what is commensurate with the
actual out-of-pocket loss caused by the defendant and suffered by the
plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Illinois in Wicks v. Cuneo-Henneberry'8
ruled that the plaintiff must have paid or become liable to pay the amount,
and the charges for the services must have been reasonable.
The Drinkwater case is the supporting case for the theory of compen-
satory damages in New York and was upheld in the Coyne case. In the
Drinkwater case the plaintiff received both his wages and nursing services
gratuitously, and the court ruled that claims for such could form no part
of plaintiff's damages because the plaintiff suffered no pecuniary loss.19
Although it is almost unanimous that the courts do not allow mitiga-
tion of damages in the contribution situation, the courts divide where the
collateral source is gratuitous. The reason for this split is a difference in
the rationale between the courts. The majority of courts do not allow
mitigation of damages in either the contribution or gratuitous situations.
These courts base their decisions on the collateral source doctrine. The
rationale behind the doctrine is that a tortfeasor should not be able to
benefit from that which was meant to help the plaintiff, or that he should
not escape the consequences of his wrongful act because the plaintiff re-
ceived a benefit from a third party.20 The majority courts reason that in
pension and insurance cases, the premiums are in the nature of an invest-
ment which should not inure to the benefit of the defendant wrongdoer.21
The decisions of the courts which do not allow mitigation of damages
in contribution situations, but do allow mitigation of damages in gratui-
tous situations, are based upon the compensatory theory of damages. In
the Leon case, the plaintiff, who was paid his full wages by his employer,
was not allowed to collect damages for his loss of work during his dis-
abled period, but the court allowed the plaintiff to recover the hospital
bills which had already been paid by an insurance plan. These courts be-
lieve that where the plaintiff has received benefits from insurance policies
18 319 111. 344, 150 N.E. 276 (1925).
19 The New York legislature attempted to reverse the Drinkwater case and thereby
conform New York law to that of the majority, by introducing a bill in the New York
State Senate and Assembly in 1956, but the bill was defeated.
20 Cincinnati N.O. & T.P. Ry. v. Perkins, 205 Ky. 798, 266 S.W. 652 (1924); Pawlicki
v. Detroit United Ry., 191 Mich. 536, 158 N.W. 162 (1916).
21 1ehr v. City of New York, 219 N.Y.S. 2d 308, 30 Misc. 2d 953 (1961).
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or pension plans to which he has contributed, the plaintiff actually paid
out of his pocket in advance for such future benefits, and where the plain-
tiff has not contributed, such payments by the collateral source, usually
the employer, are compensation for past services of the plaintiff.22 Thus
to permit recovery, these courts consider both pensions and insurance as
something for which the plaintiff has paid over the years, with his serv-
ices or the premium deductions serving as his compensatory loss.
The Coyne case highlights this difference in rationale among the courts
and stands firmly on the compensatory theory of damages. There is an
inconsistency in the decisions of these courts, upholding the compensatory
theory, in that they allow full recovery in the contribution cases. Under
this theory, it would seem that the plaintiff should be allowed to recover
only the premiums or payments for the insurance plan or pension fund to
which they contributed his out-of-pocket loss.
Benefits from a collateral source will aid either the plaintiff or the de-
fendant. Whether the benefit given to the plaintiff was one of friendship,
philanthropy, or contract, the interests of the parties and society are bet-
ter served where the courts apply the collateral source doctrine and the
plaintiff, to whom the gift was intended, is allowed the benefit.
22 Poniatowski v. City of New York, 220 N.Y.S. 2d 854, 30 Misc. 2d 865 (1961);
Devine v. City of Chicago, 172 Ill. App. 246 (1912).
DAMAGES-COMPUTATION BY USE OF A
PER DIEM FORMULA
During the trial of a rear-end automobile accident case, plaintiff's at-
torney suggested to the jury that fair compensation for his client's pain
and suffering could be computed by using a mathematical formula in
which a given dollar value was assigned to each day of pain and suffering
and then multiplied over the plaintiff's lifetime as computed on a standard
mortality table. The defendant appealed the $20,000 verdict, assigning as
error the use of a per diem argument for pain and suffering. The Appel-
late'Court affirmed, holding that the per diem argument was logically
suggested by the evidence and that per diem argument falls within ac-
cepted lines of advocacy. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered a new
trial, ruling that although counsel might suggest a total monetary award
for pain and suffering, the practice of counsel explaining to the jury a
formula and suggested figures to arrive at a suggested amount of money
for pain and suffering transcends the bounds of proper argument. Caley
v. Manicke, 24 I11. 2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962).
